The Theory and . Measurement of Producer Response Under Quotas
· Introduction
There has rec~mtly been a revival of interest in the implications of rationing~or mote generally of quantity constraints, ina number of different branches of economic theory, Much of the earlier work on rationing was done during and immediately after World War II. The principal tesults establishing locally valid relationships between demand curve slopes under rationed and \lllfationed .
. conditions were derived by Tobin and Houthakker (1950-51) . Related works were surveyed by Tobin (1952) , the results were later restated by Pollak (1969) , and were extended by Howard (1977) , Latham (1980) , Neary and Roberts (1980) , and Deaton (1981) 1 . In particular, the lasnwo authors illustrate how duality theory canbe·usedto.generate empirically.estimable demand.functions under .. rationing in the same way that it can do so. in the unrationed case.
. In this paper we extend the work on demand theory under rationing to explore the implications . of quantity· constraints in the. context of production theory. . Because of the presence of short-run adjustment costs leading to shott-,.run input fixity or because of regulatory or institutionalconstraints, that results in dual markets. In Canada, in the European Community, and in the United States, production quotas have been implemented for dairy products, tobacco, peanuts and poultry.
Mandatory sales of agricultural output at below free market prices have been features of India, Indonesia, China, and many African nations. Quantity restrictions became widely used in international trade as substitute tariffs after the Tokyo round of GAIT negotiations. All of these cases have a common attribute, kink points in the iso-cost se~s of firms. These kinkpoints arise from binding constraints on inputs or outputs or other types of restrictions that result in kink points in the interior (as opposed to the vertices) of iso~cost sets, the extreme case being a quantity constraint.
In empirical analysis, it is often important to be able to represent an unrationed supply/demand function in terms of a rationed one, and vice-versa. Such functions are necessary if we wish to predict behavior under rationing where we have observations only on free supply; more importantly, they can be used in the converse situation of predicting unrationed behavior from observations on a market under rationing. Similarly, we may wish to estimate a system of firm supplies and derived demands for a cross~section or time-series of firms; some of which are rationed and some of which are not. Such functions can be estimated effici\;mtly if a common technology with common parameters is assumed for all firms so that the same parameters appear in the two sets of functions. In this paper, section 2 characterizes the firm's behavior under rationing in·terms of its unconstrained behavior when faced with virtual prices. Section 3" discusses the specificationof flexible functional form models under rationing. Finally, an, empirical e:l):ample is presented in which the structure of the unrestricted supply curve of a quota-restrieted commodity, tobacco, is retrieved from observations on the quota-restricted markets. This methodology provides the necessary information to simulate the effects of deregulation. Section 5 is a summary with conclusions.
2. Quota-Constrained Versus Unconstrained.Behavior
. .
In their classic treatment, Tobiµ and Ifouthakker . . manipulated the first-order conditions to obtain properties of the derivatives of the rationed demands. They obtained locally valid relationships between the derivatives of the rationed and unrationed functions; for example, the Le Chatelier result . . . .
:
. (Samuelson 1947, pp. 163-69 ) that at the pdce at which the ration would have been just bought, the · cm;npensated demand curve is no steeper, with rationing than withoutit. Papers by Wales and
Woodland (1983) , Hausman (1985) ., and Lee and Pitt (1986) (Rothbarth { 1941) ) are the prices that would induce an unrationed household to behave in the same manner as when faced with a given vector of ration constrah1ts.. · · ··fia<Pi~Pai.Y2,:z) ~·max(P1,Y1 +P?.''y2: : "' ..
We can characterize the differences between the quota-constrained and unconstrained firm behavior by examining first and second derivatives of (7). Differentiating with re~pect to p 1 and using (5) we obtain · .
Applying Hotelling's lemma to (8), we conclude that ( 9) that is, the optimal vector of non-quota goods under a quota regime (y~) is identical to the optimal unconstrained vector (yy) if the latter is evaluated at virtual prices.
Differentiating (7) with respect to quota levels y 2 , we obtain (10)
Thus, the marginal effect of a.change in the quota level is simply the difference between the market price and the virtual price for the quota input or output (see Figure 1) . We refer to this value as quota rent, designated as r = P2 -Pv.
Finally, differentiating (7) with respect to fixed inputs z,
Thus, the vector of shadow prices for the fixed inputs is the same under a quota regime .as under a non"'quota regime evaluated at p 2 · = Pv·
6
The comparative statics of the non-quota and quota regimes can be further elaborated by deriving the Hessians of the former in terms of the latter and vice versa. To do this, we first differentiate (8) with respect to p 1 and y 2 to obtain (12) and (13) Now differentiating (10) with respect to p 1 and y 2 , we have (14) and (15) Finally, we differentiate (5) with respect to y 2 , to obtain (16) Equations (12) 
Next, from (13) and (15) (18) Finally, from (12), (14) and (18),
In a similar fashionthe, Hessian of the constrained profit function may be expressed in terms of the unconstrained Hessians as·
Equations (17)- (19) show how one may deduce the slopes of the supply and demand curves of a. non-quota regime if slopes for a quota regime are known, while equations. (20)- (22) ·provide the opposite transformation. Since these results are derived frqm nu evaluated at p 2 = Pv, the transformations are exact only at the quota-constrained equilibrium corresponding to quota level y 2 .
The results provide second-order approximations to the unconstrained profit function in the vicinity of
the constrained equilibrium. This is equivalent to a first ~order approximation of the supply and demand functions such as that shown in Figure 1 . Here we can see that the estimates of a profit function for a firni constrained by a quota to output Y:!j will provide estimates of the unconstrained equilibrium level Yzj via linear approximation through point a.
Some additional interpretation of these results is useful. The last term of (19) is negative semidefinite, and the last in (22) is positive semi-definite (Lau, 1976) . Thus, under quota constraints, the quantity responses to price changes are smaller than those in the unrationed case. This LeChatelier effect is illustrated in Figure 2 . For the case of a single rationed output commodity such as we consider later in this paper, equation (19) shows that the own-price supply elasticity of a variable output under a non-quota regime is equal to it~ own-price elasticity under a quota regime plus a non-negative term. The non-negative term is the product of three sub-terms: the resp.onseof variable outputs to the quota level; the response of the quota commodity to its virtualprice; and the response of virtual prices to the price of variable commodities. The second term is non .. positive due to concavity· of the. profit function, and the first· and third have the same sign.
From (21), if there is but one rationed commodity, the effect of a quota on output(input) y 2 j, i.e., a decrease in y 2 j, on a. non-quota output is to increase the supply (demand) ofthe lattercif they are gross substitutes. and to decrease it if they are gross complements. Since the order of . .
differentiation is irrelevant, (21) also indicates that the effect on non-quota outputs of relaxlng the constraintis equal to the effect of a decrease in the price of the non-quota output on the ;'virtual''· price of the quota commodity. Therefore, anincrease in the price of the non,.quota commodity causes the virtual price of quota commodities to rise. if they are gross substitutes and to fall if they are gross complements. variable and can be set to its profit-maximizing value for each value of P2j· The constrained profit functions show how profit increases with p 2 j when y 2 j is held fixed at some.particular value: ygj, Yij·
For example, the constrained profitis everywhere below the dotted curve except at A,\vhere ygi is optimal for pgi; and this is also true for Yii .at B. The fact that the unconstrained profit funCtioil is more "convex" than any of the constrained functions indicates thatthe constrained sl.lbstifutioneffects·· are al ways le8s than the unconstrained effects. Note that it does not depend on any special.
relationship between the commodity whose substitution effects are being analyzed and the commodity .
. ' . .
being held fixed. This result is often cited to support the proposition. that government controls aml restrictions render firm behavior less flexible and responsive to changes in the economic environment. 
Also, : . .'
Similarly, we obtain
Thus (17a)- (19a) show that the transformation of elasticities from the quota-constrained regime to the unconstrained regime are complicated by the product of the two diagonal·matrices~ Similar · derivations for the partial profit function, however, provide the more direct transformations
Thu. s ·an advantage of estimating a partial· profit function to a quota-constrained regime rather than· the . .
. constrained functiOn is that the elastieities are directly transformable to the elasticities Of the non.:
quota regime.
The constrained profit function (2) represents variable producer profits under rationing and itis particularly useful in welfare analysis of rationing. it provides a basis for an empirical measur~ement
of the willingness of the decision-maker to pay for a particular change ih ~ome paramete~' say' from ' a. 0 tO a 1 , The cost or willingness to pay for such a change can be 1neasured as ,.,
«o If a = pli, then using Hotelling's lemma, the amount by which the fi.1111 must be compensated for a price change is given by
This provides a measure of the change in producer surplus due to a price change. The presence of rationing poses no new difficulties for the calculation of valid measures of producer (27) surplus. Using the restricted profit function in (2), and with a=yi, sonie useful additional welfare results can be obtained. Using (10), we have yiJ yiJ
Y2J
The above expression provides an exact measure of the firm's willingness to pay for a change in the quota level of output i. The shaded area of Figure 1 illustrates this change in variable. profits due to additional units of y 2 j produced.
From (28), the compensation required for· a change in quantity constraints can be measured from price and quantity data and knowledge of the virtual price functions Pvj defined above. Such information is particularly useful in the economic evaluation of changes in quota policies.
A Trans!og Specification
The foregoing theory suggests that an unconstrained supply and demand system can be derived from a partial profit function estimated under a quota regime (or vice versa). We specify a translog structure for the partial profit· function,
whereX' = (ln p 1 , In y 2 , ln z)' and a 0 , a' and Bare parameters to be estimated (a scalar, a vector and a matrix; respectively). A convenient partitioning consists of a'= (~, ay, a.;)'; and Using Hotelling's lemma., the share equations for then non-quota~constrained variable inputs
. and outputs are (30) where s 1 is an n x 1 vector of optimcll shares si = Ph Yli I IF. Note that Byy and Byz, which, are needed to evaluate (17)- (22), cannot he estimated from this set of share equations. The partial. profit function itself must be.estimated, either alone or jointly with the share equations.
Given the assumptions. as stated earlier, the profit function must satisfy the properties of symmetry, monotonicity, linear homogeneity and convexity in prices, and concavity infixed quantities; Appropriate restrictions on the parameters are imposed in the estimation procedure so that · .
the translog profit function satisfies symmetry and linear·homogeneity i~ prices. ···.Mon~tonicity, convexity and concavity are not general properties of the ttanslog; They cannotbe .conveniently imposed with linear restrictions on parameters of equations (29) and (30). Instead, the ccmsisterrcy Of the estimated share equations. with these properties must be evaluated after· estimation. ·To. satisfy the. monotonicity condition, the estimated shares must be positive. For convexity in prices; the Hessian implied by the estimated BPP submatrix must be positive semidefinite, and for concavity in fixed · quantities, the Hessians implied by Byy and Bzz must be negative semidefinite.
Once the parameters of (29) prices (for fixed iI1puts) with respect to netput prices, quota levels, and fixedinputlevels. This elasticity matrix• C<!Il be evaluated for a given .set of values of the exoge11ous variables by using the . estimated coefficients and the predicted shares as (32) where EP is the matrix of elasticities of netputs, virtual prices and shadow prices of inputs with ·. respectto prices, quota levels and fixed inputs, and s is a vector .of predicted shares for the given values· of exogeneous variables.
An Applicatjon: Estimating TobaccoSupply Elasticity
The production of U.S. tobacco has been subject to federal outputrestrictions since the t930s, first in the form of acreage controls, and later in theJorm of production quotas (since 1965 for fluecured tobacco, and since 1971 for burley; the other major tobacco type)3. In this section we utilize · the theory developed to estimate the supply elasticity of this crop, a crucial parameterin evaluating potential changes in tobacco policy.
(a) The Data
We·have chosen to estimate the tobacco supply elasticity.for.North Carolina;.whiCh is the largest tobacco:-producing state, accounting for about one~third of total U,S, production. The primary a richer empirical base than would be the case for p.S. agriculture as a whole,.in which tobacco's share of revenues is less than 4 % during this period. We estimate a strucfure with two outputs (tobacco and all other crop and livestock products), one variaple input. (production inputs inch,iding hired labor) and three fixed inputs (land, capital and the stock of research krtowleqge). Table 1 describes these variables,. and the full data set is included in the Appendix.
Among the data required for estimation of the profit function.are expected prices, which are
•.
. not direc~ly observable. Our proxy for expected prices is. a set of predictions .frqm ARIMA (p, d, q) models estimated from the time series of realized: prices. Using Akaike's (1974) information criterion.
. . and the Q-statistic (Ljung and Box 1978) ; the accepted models were an AR(l) for output price and an.
AR (2) for variable input price.
b) Econometric &timation
We estimate equations (29) asymptotically efficient. In addition, they provide estimates invariantto the choice of equation deleted. The ITSUR option of the SYSNLIN procedure in SAS was used for estimation. · · Using the expected prices. fitted with the AR models and the data described in the previous section, the equations (29) and (30) estimates of the n~stricted model. The table contains a total oftwenty-eight parameters, sixof which are significant at th~ 1% level, five at the53 level, and six at the 103 level.!
In addition to the imposed properties of symmetry and. homogeneity, monotonicity and convexity iff prices are additional properties of a profit function that cannot be.satisfied globally with •.
the translog function. However, they may hold at the specific data points used in estimating the fµnction>" For the estimatesin Table 2 , monotonicity is satisfi.ed at the point of explUision,. but is .. violated for 2 out of 6 predicted shares at the mean .of .the data, and for 39 of the 192 predicted shares
at the individual data points. Convexity is violatedif own~price elasticities have the wrong sign.
There are no such viol~tions at the average of the data points, but there are at 44 of the 192 data points.
c) EStimate$ of Supply and Demand Elasticities
We use equation (32), with. predicted s.hares evaluated at the mean: values of variable~, to caH:ulate the estimated elasticities of optimal production decisions in response.to changes in prices and fixed.quantities .. The results, shown in Table3, indicate a non·t~bacco output supply elasticity of ~24 , and a derived variable input demand elasticity of -A 1, estimates that are• IOwer .than we expected but consistent with other estimates of aggregate.agricultural supply.and demand elasticities. The key elasticity of Interest in this study is the price elasticity of the latent tobacco supply curve, which is the · inverse of the third· element on the diagonal Of Table 3 . This estimated price elasticity is about 7 :0.
This.is a large elasticity, larger than the recent estimates of 4.0to 5.6 by.Goodwinand Sull1ner (1990), who used a different approach with cross-'sectional county4evel data for arec~ntte11·year Th~ remaining diagonal elements in Table 3 indicate that the derived demand elasticities for ·. la11d and capital are ..,.25 and -1.66, n~spectively (with other prices constantand tobacco quota fixed), and that· there are increasing marginal returns .to·. the research variable. Other key. results fr,om Table 3 related to the existence of a quota commodity are the negative unit elasticities of output and variable input use with .respect to changes in the tobacco quota (the first is plausible, the second is surprising but plausible). The elasticity of tobacco supply price with respect to the price of other output is 2.47
and with respect to the price of variable inputs is -1.47 (an unexpected and implausible sign). This partial review of the econometric results indicates that the diagonal elements of the elasticities in Table 3 have appropriate signs· and expected magnitudes, while the off-diagonal elements contain some estimates that are difficult to rationalize, though theoretically possible'.
Since this approach to estimating the latent tobacco supply elasticity rests on measuring the economic effects of reallocating resources between tobacco and other jointly produced· outputs, it is useful to test thisjointness property. For the restricted profit function, nonjointness between aggregate output and tobacco requires that the second-order cross coeffiCient between these two variables (-.135 inour case) be equal to the negative ofthe product ofthe corresponding first-order coefficients (4.75 and -11.94 in .our case). A likelihood ratio test, conditional on the maintained hypothesis of symmetry, homogeneity in prices and in fixed commodities, rejects this nun hypothesis at the 5% level.
Equation (22b) provides a measure of how the supply elasticity of non-:tobacco products would change if the tobacco quota system were eliminated .. We obtain the surprising result that elimination
Of quotas would increase the non-to,bacco supply elasticity frbm .24 to 17 .67. To see why this effect is so large, recall that the last matrix expression of (22b) augments the elasticity·matrix for a quota regime to obtain the corresponding portion of the elasticity matrix for an unconstrained regime. For the case of a single rationed CQmmOdity and a 1 single aggregate of other commodities, the augmentation of output supply elasticity consists of the negative of the following. product: elasticity of tobacco virtual price with respect to other output price (2.47) times the elasticity of tobacco output with respect to tobacco virtual price (6.97) times the elasticity of other output with respect to tobacco . output (-1.01), .which equals 17.43. The comparable LeChatelier effect on input demand. is to increase elasticity from -.41 to -1. 97, also a very large effect. These large elasticities and LeChatelier effects could be valid at the average of our data set.but seem unlikely to hold over the range between the constrained and unconstrained equilibrium points, so we are more cautious in making inferences from those results than from the estimated supply elasticity of tobacco itself.
Summary and Conclusions
We have discussed the theory of producer response under quotas and have shown how duality theory and the concept of virtual prices may be used to simplify and extend this theory. y1 .
